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Most research assumes organizational managers should establish high levels of trust. 
Other scholars suggest trust is declining and therefore raises an important managerial 
dilemma. We present a study of trust based on contingency theory and hypothesize that 
trust levels may vary depending on alternative organizational designs. Using ELICIT, a 
multiplayer intelligence game, we conduct laboratory experiments to examine the 
relationship between trust levels, organizational design, and performance measures. 
Results show that trust and organizational design have strong interactions, and that high 
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Trust is important in organizations. Interpersonal trust among coworkers and 
between workers and managers can enhance efficiency by reducing the need for 
governance (Van de Ven, 2004), improve organizational performance (Zand, 1972), 
affect psychological contracts (Robinson, 1996), and may be important for organizations 
facing threats or crisis situations (Powley & Piderit, 2008; Powley, in press). Also, 
interpersonal trust is viewed widely as essential for knowledge sharing within 
organizations (Bazerman & Neale, 1992), and the concept organizational trust is viewed 
likewise as important for knowledge sharing between organizations (Zand, 1972; Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Nooteboom, 1996). Due to its importance in the 
organization, substantial research on trust has been conducted and published (e.g., see 
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Kramer & Cook, 2004; 
Kramer, 2006; Bachmann & Zaheer, 2006). The majority of such research either assumes 
or argues that organizational managers should always seek to establish and foster trust in 
their organizations.  
However, research also indicates that trust levels have been declining over the 
past half-century (Bruhn, 2001) and that breaches in the psychological contract lead to 
loss of trust (Robinson, 1996). This raises an important issue for managers of 
organizations that do not enjoy high levels of trust and calls into some question whether 
management should strive universally to increase trust levels within organizations. Far 
less research has been conducted and published on how mistrust can be managed with 
equal organizational effectiveness; notable exceptions include work highlighting factors 
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of suspicion, cynicism and distrust (Fein & Hilton, 1994; Kramer, 1998; Omodei & 
McLennan, 2000). If high levels of trust in the organization cannot be guaranteed, then 
trust level becomes an organizational contingency factor, and a half-century of research 
on Contingency Theory (see Donaldson, 2001) suggests that different organizational 
designs may be comparatively more or less appropriate for different trust levels. 
Unfortunately, only a few examples of research are available to guide organizational 
design on the basis of trust-mistrust (see Creed & Miles, 1996). 
In this article, we address the level of trust as a contingency factor in 
organizational design and examine comparative performance in conditions exhibiting 
mistrust as well as trust. Using the ELICIT multiplayer intelligence game in a laboratory 
setting (see Leweling and Nissen, 2007), we conduct a series of experiments to examine 
how trust level and organizational design affect—directly and via interactions—
performance in the context of a counterterrorism problem solving task environment. 
Results suggest that trust and organizational design have strong interactions and reveal a 
complex design space in which high levels of trust are not always necessary for good 
performance. Results reveal also a substantial penalty for organizations with rigid, 
hierarchical designs that impede the benefits of high trust levels. We close with key 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section we summarize a core set of literature on trust and organizational 
design to build upon through the experimentation discussed below.  
A. TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Trust in organizational decision-making is critical for successful outcomes. It has 
been widely viewed as the primary lubricant of interpersonal relations in organizations 
(Gambetta, 1988). Higher levels of trust are associated with cooperation and higher 
effectiveness (Butler, 1995). Zand (1972) showed that a high level of trust is related to 
positive performance, satisfaction, timely and accurate information, and overall 
confidence in others. In particular Zand (1972) and others (Driscoll, 1978) demonstrated 
that organizational trust is positively associated with greater satisfaction of decision-
making quality. Like successful negotiations, effective decision-making requires parties 
to a establish relationships of trust and share information (Bazerman & Neale, 1992). 
Trust is critical for leaders (Mishra & Mishra, 2008), particularly in crisis or other 
extreme events (Powley & Taylor, 2006). Corporate governance boards and senior 
management of any corporation is beholden to the trust afforded them by outside 
stakeholders and shareholders. Such public trust is granted as organizations respond to 
environmental, social, or economic problems proactively and responsibly with the good 
of the stakeholder ahead of its own motives. Agency theory is instructive for such 
situations (Eisenhardt, 1989). In particular, trust is garnered when cooperative agents and 
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principals act in accordance with approved, transparent practices, and share risks 
associated with the decisions being made.  
Trust has been conceptualized primarily in terms of social exchange theory (Blau, 
1964) with the net result of interpersonal relationships as either positive or negative (Pratt 
& Dirks, 2007). Pratt and Dirks argue that social exchange is implied in definitions of 
trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998). Trust therefore requires risk and vulnerability in an exchange 
relationship. The widely accepted view of trust follows Mayer, Davis and Schoorman’s 
(1995) review of the trust literature: “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party.”   
Established through various relational mechanisms trust involves concern for 
others and benevolence (Zand, 1972; Fisher & Brown, 1988). The trust literature 
identifies three basic components of trust in organizations: ability, benevolence and 
integrity (Mayer, et al., 1995). We use these three components of trust to induce an 
attitude and climate of trust and mistrust in our experiment, and summarize their effects 
in the research design below. 
In terms of trust, the literature is overwhelming in support for high trust levels 
enhancing performance, albeit with comparatively little attention to conditions of 
mistrust. The first hypothesis addresses this. 
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Hypothesis 1. Organizational performance under conditions of high trust will be 
greater than under conditions of low trust, regardless of organizational design.  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
In this section we summarize a core set of literature on organizational design as it 
pertains to trust. Through our review of the organizational design literature, linkages 
between organizational contingencies and designs are central. Beginning with seminal 
works by Burns and Stalker (1961), Woodward (1965), and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), 
organization and management theory has been guided by the understanding that no single 
approach to organizing is best in all circumstances. Moreover, myriad empirical studies 
(e.g., Argote, 1982; Donaldson, 1987; Hamilton & Shergill, 1992; Keller, 1994; cf. Mohr, 
1971; Pennings, 1975) have confirmed and reconfirmed that poor organizational fit 
degrades performance. Indeed, organization and management scholars have come to 
understand well how various organizational forms are and should be designed and 
changed to fit specific contingency contexts (Creed & Miles, 1996).  
For instance, scholars have identified an array of multiple contingency factors 
(e.g., age, environment, size, strategy, technology) that organizations must address and 
articulated how they must be addressed as a multicontingency set (e.g., see Gresov & 
Drazin, 1997) along with other dimensions of organizational life. Indeed, building 
recently upon such research, Burton et al. (2006) identify 14 contingency factors (e.g., 
goal, strategy, environment) that an organization must address simultaneously, and they 
explain how the set of factors can change through time, circumstance and management 
action. Trust is not included in this set, however, even though the literature above 
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suggests that it may represent an important contingency factor in terms of organizational 
design. 
Moreover, since most organizations require considerable time to change structure 
(Pant, 1998)—or to raise low levels of trust within an existing structure—managers need 
to anticipate future changes across the whole set of contingency factors, including events 
that may impact trust levels negatively. In response, numerous researchers have been 
examining less rigid and bureaucratic, flexible and adaptable organizational structures 
that are designed more for frequent and/or abrupt change than for control and stable 
performance. For several instances: Tushman and O’Reilly (1999) discuss ambidextrous 
organizations, which are able to operate simultaneously in multiple modes; Lengnick-
Hall and Beck (2005) discuss robust transformation, through which an organization seeks 
to develop responsiveness, flexibility and an expanded action repertoire as opposed to 
seeking high levels of fit; Alberts & Hayes, 2003 discuss Edge organizations, which 
emphasize agility across multiple, unpredictable environments, as opposed to current or 
adaptive performance in any specific contingency context; and Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1997) suggest that organizational semistructures, capable of balancing order and 
flexibility, provide a superior approach to highly dynamic environments. As above, 
however, such research directs little attention to trust as a contingency factor, even 
though one might expect for trust to be important in flexible organizations. 
In terms of organizational design, substantial current research exhorts managers to 
emphasize agile, adaptable, flexible organizational structures, albeit with comparatively 
little attention to organizational trust. The second hypothesis addresses this: 
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Hypothesis 2. Organizational performance under conditions of Edge 
organizational designs will be greater than under conditions of Hierarchical 
designs, regardless of trust levels. 
Trust has received some attention as a contingency of organizational design 
(Miles & Creed, 1995; Miles & Snow, 1992; Powell, 1990; Bromiley & Cumminings, 
1992), and it has been viewed as an important aspect of organizational design and as a 
general control mechanism (Bradach & Eccles, 1989) primarily because the emergence of 
less bureaucratic organizational forms has made trust a more central issue in 
organizational theory (Grey & Garsten, 2000). Moreover, a shift in organizational design, 
toward a more networked, team-based environment and away from a traditional top-down 
Hierarchical form results in higher quality and productivity (Banker et al., 1996). Indeed 
networked, Edge-like arrangements are dependent on high levels of trust (Creed & Miles, 
1996), and Bromiley and Cummings (1992) suggest that trustworthiness affects structures 
and processes such that high trust environments have lower transaction costs.  
Nonetheless, as noted above, we are left without specific guidance regarding how 
to design organizations—even flexible ones—that do not enjoy high levels of trust or the 
extent to which rigid (e.g., bureaucratic) organizations benefit and suffer from high and 
low trust levels, respectively. Moreover, the potentially most interesting hypotheses relate 
to interactions between trust and organizational design. The following four hypotheses 
address this. 
Hypothesis 3. Organizational performance under conditions of high trust and 
Edge organizational designs will be greater than with low trust and Edge designs. 
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Hypothesis 4. Organizational performance under conditions of high trust and 
Hierarchical organizational designs will be greater than with low trust and 
Hierarchical designs. 
Hypothesis 5. Organizational performance under conditions of high trust and 
Edge organizational designs will be greater than with high trust and Hierarchical 
designs. 
Hypothesis 6. Organizational performance under conditions of low trust and 





III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this section, we draw heavily from Leweling and Nissen (2007) and Moonier, 
Baker and Greene (2008) to summarize the research design. Building upon prior 
experimentation, we employ the ELICIT multiplayer intelligence game in a laboratory 
setting to conduct a series of experiments and examine how trust level and organizational 
design affect—directly and via interactions—performance in the context of a 
counterterrorism problem solving task environment, in which both trust and 
organizational design are expected to play a role. We begin by describing this ELICIT 
environment and then outline the subjects, groups, protocols, controls, manipulations and 
measurements used for experimentation. 
A. ELICIT ENVIRONMENT  
ELICIT requires a team of subjects performing the roles of intelligence analysts to 
collaborate—in a networked, information-processing environment—and identify a 
fictitious and stylized terrorist plot. One would expect trust to play a role in terms of 
organizational performance in this domain (e.g., lower trust levels would likely impede 
subjects’ willingness to collaborate through information sharing and processing). One 
would also expect organizational design to play a role (e.g., for more rigid organizational 
structures would likely stifle subjects’ opportunities to collaborate through information 
sharing and processing). 
The fictitious terrorist plot is described through a set of informational clues called 
“factoids” that have been developed systematically. ELICIT’s design is similar to the 
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Parker Brothers’ board game “Clue” in that it requires each player to analyze clues and 
combine assessments with other players to identify key aspects of the fictitious plot. Each 
factoid describes some aspect of the plot, but none is sufficient to answer all of the 
pertinent questions (i.e., Who will execute the attack? What is the target to be attacked? 
Where will the attack take place? When will the attack take place?).  
The factoids are distributed among the players in a series of steps: each player 
receives two clues initially, followed by one after five minutes of play and another after 
ten minutes have elapsed. The factoid distribution is designed so that no single player can 
solve the problem individually and that the team of players cannot solve the problem until 
after the final distribution. In other words, the players must collaborate to solve the 
problem, and they are required to do so for a minimum of ten minutes. Evidence from 
previous experiments (e.g., Parity, 2006) suggests that play requires substantially more 
time (e.g., an hour or more). 
Subjects play the game via client applications on separate, networked computer 
workstations. Each subject has access to a set of five functions supported by the client 
application: 1) List, 2) Post, 3) Pull, 4) Share, and 5) Identify. After the game has 
completed, the administrator ends the simulation from the server application. The 
ELICIT application captures time-stamped interactions (e.g., Post, Pull, Identify, List 
functions) including, for instance, when and which factoids are distributed to each player, 
when and which factoids are posted to which common screens, when and which common 
screens are viewed by each player, when and which factoids are shared between each 
player, and the time stamped results of each player’s Identify attempt (i.e., to identify the 
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who, what, where and when). The game requires considerable cognitive and collaborative 
effort to play well (i.e., identify the pertinent details of a terrorist plot), but experience 
indicates that such effort is within the capabilities of many people and groups. 
B.  SUBJECTS 
Subjects for this study comprise 136 graduate students enrolled in a core 
organizational behavior course at a major university. Such students consist of military 
officers and government employees in the United States and other allied countries. All 
subjects have undergraduate college degrees as well as direct military service, and some 
of the subjects have worked professionally in military or government intelligence 
organizations. Hence the subjects are representative in part of the kinds of relatively well-
educated and experienced people who serve as professional intelligence analysts, 
particularly in national intelligence agencies.  
C.  TREATMENT GROUPS 
Subjects are assigned to one of four groups of 17 members each (see Table 1). To 
ensure that groups were comparable, we equally distributed subjects based on age and 
experience among the eight groups. Each group also contains an equally distributed 
representation of military service branch, organizations, officer subspecialties, genders, 
and country of service to mimic conditions associated with the kinds of international, 
coalition organizations working counterterrorism problems today. The most senior 





Trust Level Hierarchical Edge 
High Hi-Hierarchical Hi-Edge 
Low Low-Hierarchical Low-Edge 
 
Table 1. Treatment Groups. 
 
Subjects report to a networked classroom on their assigned day for the 
experiment. Once seated, subjects are allotted ten minutes to read a set of instructions 
pertaining to both the experiment and the ELICIT environment; they are encouraged to 
ask questions about the experimental settings and ELICIT environment. Once subjects 
read the instructions they have ten minutes to discuss their approach to the problem-
solving scenario with others in their group and take a short break before beginning. 
Subjects communicate with one another during game play using only the computer-
network capabilities supported by ELICIT (esp. Post, Pull and Share), and they do not 
reveal their simulation-defined pseudonyms. The simulation ends after approximately 45 
minutes and all players are given the option to identify the plot details. 
D.  MANIPULATIONS 
The four unique treatment conditions (i.e., edge-trust, edge mis-trust, hierarchical-
trust, or hierarchical-mistrust) are embedded in the instructions subjects read before 
beginning the simulation. We summarize the trust and mistrust treatments first and then 
follow with those pertaining to the Hierarchical and Edge organizations. 
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Trust. As noted above, the trust manipulation is based on the three trust 
components (i.e., ability, benevolence, integrity; see Mayer et al., 1995). Trust as a 
treatment is accomplished through verbal and written communications with the subjects. 
For instance, ability as a trust component is enhanced with the verbal suggestion that, 
“your intellect, varying skills, and past experience lead us to believe that you are well 
qualified to solve the terrorist threat problem.” As another instance, benevolence as a 
trust component is increased with the statement, “members of your community share 
information freely with a general orientation toward doing good to others. We are 
impressed with this orientation and are encouraged by the positive interactions among 
your fellow cohort members.” As a third instance, integrity as a trust component is 
bolstered by confirming that, “your actions will be consistent, congruent, and credible 
with established protocols and guidelines.” 
Mistrust. The mistrust manipulation is based on undermining the three trust 
components from above. As with trust, mistrust as a treatment is accomplished through 
verbal and written communications with the subjects. For instance, ability as a trust 
component is undermined with the verbal suggestion that, “we have yet to assess your 
intellect and skills, and wonder whether past experience qualifies you to solve the 
terrorist threat problem as a group.” As another instance, benevolence as a trust 
component is undermined with the statements: “members of your community normally 
work well together but frequently withhold information from each other. We are unsure 
about how you interact among your fellow cohort members and question whether 
negative interactions have affected your relationships” and “previous sessions reveal that 
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some individuals take pride in undermining team cohesion and effectiveness by 
generating and releasing false information or by non-participation in the exercise.” As a 
third instance, integrity as a trust component is undermined by confirming that, “we are 
discouraged that when it comes to solving critical problems in group settings such as this 
that your actions may not be consistent, congruent, and credible with established 
protocols and guidelines. Simply put, be wary of moles and free-riders.” 
Hierarchy. To operationalize the Hierarchical organization we draw from 
Mintzberg (1979) and look to the Machine Bureaucracy archetype. For ease of 
presentation we refer to such archetype simply as “Hierarchy” here. 
As depicted in Figure 1 the Hierarchy group is stratified into three functional 
levels. The Senior Leader is responsible for the intelligence organization as a whole and 
has four Team Leaders (middle managers) reporting directly (the most senior subject is 
assigned to play this role). The most senior subject is assigned to play the role of the 
Senior Leader in the Hierarchy. Each team leader in turn has three Team Members 
(Operators) reporting directly and is responsible for one set of details associated with the 
terrorist plot. For instance, Team Leader (Who) and his or her team are responsible for 
the “who” details (e.g., which terrorist organization is involved) of the plot, Team Leader 
(What) and his or her team are responsible for the “what” details (e.g., what the likely 
target is), and so forth for “where” and “when.”  
 Figure 1.   Hierarchy Organization. 
 
Additionally, the ELICIT software limits subjects’ Post (i.e., sharing factoids with 
others) and Pull (accessing factoids posted by others) access to specific common screens 
within this manipulation. Specifically, those players in the “who” group, for instance, are 
allowed to Post to and Pull from only one of the four common screens (i.e., the “who” 
screen) noted above. Comparable restrictions apply to players in the other three 
functional groups. The only exception applies to the Senior Leader, who has post-pull 
access to all four common screens.” 
Hence Team Leaders may share factoids only with the Senior Leader, other Team 
Leaders or their subordinate Team Members. Team Members may share factoids only 
with others in their team and with the Team Leaders. No one but the Senior Leader may 
post globally (which would share factoids with all individuals), and each solution group 
in the Hierarchy may only Pull factoids pertaining to their specific group’s task (i.e., who, 
what, where, or when). Subjects are shown this organization chart, told of their 
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responsibilities within the organization, and provided with a short description of the 
Hierarchy.  
Edge organization. To operationalize the Edge organization we draw from 
Alberts and Hayes (2003) and look to the Edge archetype (see Nissen, 2005). For ease of 
presentation we refer to such archetype simply as “Edge” here. As depicted in Figure 2, 
the Edge Organization is very different than the Hierarchy. There are no Hierarchical 
levels or functional areas; rather, the organization is flat, and all participants are free to 
work on any aspects (i.e., who, what, where and when) of the problem. There is no 
defined Senior Leader who has more or less responsibility than any of the other 
participants. To be consistent with the assignment of roles, however, the most senior 
subject in the treatment group is assigned to play the same simulation-defined role as the 
in the Hierarchy conditions.  
 





Further and more specifically, at any time, any subject assigned to the Edge group 
can: a) share factoids with any other member; b) post factoids to, c) pull factoids from 
any common screen (i.e., Who, What, Where and When); or d) Identify with partial or 
complete answers to in the terrorist plot; that is, unlike the Hierarchy manipulation, here 
the ELICIT software does not limit subjects’ information access or communication 
patterns. As above, subjects are shown this organization chart, told of their 
responsibilities within the organization, and provided with a short description of the 
Edge. 
E.  MEASUREMENTS 
Following Leweling and Nissen (2007), we operationalize performance as a two-
dimensional dependent variable comprised of: 1) speed (i.e., time to identify plot details 
correctly) and 2) accuracy (i.e., correct identification of plot details). These dependent 
measures are informed by literature in the psychological and organizational domains that 
suggest a trade-off exists between time and accuracy in tasks requiring high cognition 
and/or advanced motor skills (e.g., see Meyer et al., 1998; Beersma et al., 2003; Elliott et 
al., 2001; Plamondon & Alimi, 1997; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) 
at both the individual and team/group levels of analysis. 
In the first component, speed pertains to how long it takes a subject to submit his 
or her identification of the terrorist plot details. For ease of comparison, the scale for this 
speed measurement is normalized to a 0-1 scale, with 1 being more desirable (i.e., faster). 
Measuring and normalizing time is straightforward, as the time for each subject’s 
identification is logged to the nearest second by the software. Specifically, each subject’s 
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elapsed time is recorded when he or she uses ELICIT to Identify the plot. To construct a 
scale in which faster speeds (i.e., shorter times to Identify) result in larger values, a 
baseline time is established as the maximum time required for the slowest of all subjects 
(i.e., 2872 seconds in this experiment). Each subject’s time to identify is related to this 
baseline and normalized to produce a scaled score according to the formula: speed = 
(2872 – time) / 2872; that is, an individual subject’s time (say, for example, 2385 
seconds) would be converted to a speed score as: speed = (2872 – 2385) / 2872 = 0.1695. 
All subjects’ times are converted to speed scores in this same manner and using this same 
baseline. 
The second component of performance, accuracy, refers to the quality of the 
identification of the impending terrorist attack (i.e., Who, What, Where, and When). Each 
subject’s Identify action is scored with a value of 1 for each correct answer to the Who, 
What and Where aspect of the solution. Note, however, that the When aspect of the 
solution includes three components (i.e., Month, Day, and Time). In order to avoid 
weighting this aspect more heavily than the other three, each subject’s Identify action is 
scored with a value of 1/3 for each correct answer. The resulting sum is divided by four 
to construct a [0-1] scale; that is, an individual subject’s Identify (say, for example, 
identifies the Who, What and Where aspects correctly but is correct only on the day and 
not the month or time components of the When aspect) would be converted to an 





In this section we draw from Moonier et al. (2008) to summarize the statistical 
results of the laboratory experimentation in terms of multivariate and univariate analysis 
of variance (i.e., MANOVA and ANOVA). We then summarize key findings stemming 
from the results. 
A. STATISTICAL RESULTS  
Table 2 summarizes results in terms of the hypotheses. Each hypothesis is listed 
in the first column, and the corresponding statistical support in terms of multivariate and 
univariate analyses is noted across the other columns.  
 
Statistical Support 





1. Trust outperforms Mistrust 
regardless of organization type 
Supported Not supported Supported Main effect 
2. Edge Organization Type 
outperforms Hierarchy 
Organization Type regardless of 
trust condition 
Supported Not supported Supported Main effect 
3. Trust Edge Organization Type 
outperforms Mistrust Edge 
Organization Type  
 Supported Supported  Interaction effect 
4. Trust Hierarchy Organization 
Type outperforms Mistrust 
Hierarchy Organization Type 
 Not supported Not supported Interaction effect 
5. Edge Trust Condition 
outperforms Hierarchy Trust 
Condition 
 Supported Supported Interaction effect 
6. Edge Mistrust Condition 
Outperforms Hierarchy Mistrust 
Condition 
 Not supported Not supported Interaction effect 
 




Table 3 shows the summary results of a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA). The main effect of our Organization Type manipulation is significant at the 
0.05 level, and the main effect of our Trust manipulation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
The interaction effect of our combined Organization Type and Trust manipulation is 
highly significant. The interaction between organization type and trust appears to be 
powerful. 
 
Effect  Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Organization Type Pilia’s Trace 0.045 3.082 2 130 0.049 
 Wilk’s Lambda 0.955 3.082 2 130 0.049 
 Hotelling’s Trace 0.047 3.082 2 130 0.049 
 Roy’s Largest Root 0.047 3.082 2 130 0.049 
Trust Condition Pilia’s Trace 0.036 2.407 2 130 0.094 
 Wilk’s Lambda 0.964 2.407 2 130 0.094 
 Hotelling’s Trace 0.037 2.407 2 130 0.094 
 Roy’s Largest Root 0.037 2.407 2 130 0.094 
Organization Type *  Pilia’s Trace 0.202 16.457 2 130 0.000 
Trust Condition Wilk’s Lambda 0.798 16.457 2 130 0.000 
 Hotelling’s Trace 0.253 16.457 2 130 0.000 
 Roy’s Largest Root 0.253 16.457 2 130 0.000 
Design: Intercept+Organization Type+Trust Condition + Organization Type * TrustType 
 
Table 3. Multivariate Results. 
 
Next we examine how speed and accuracy vary separately across our 
manipulations through a series of Factorial ANOVA calculations. Table 4 shows the 
results of the ANOVA using speed scores as the dependent variable. The ANOVA 
reveals that taken independently the main effects (i.e., organization type and trust 
condition) are not significant; however, the interaction between the two main effects is 









Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model .586(a) 3 0.195 10.681 0 
Organization Type 0.022 1 0.022 1.22 0.271 
Trust Condition 0.001 1 0.001 0.051 0.821 
Organization Type *       
Trust Condition 0.561 1 0.561 30.661 0.000 
Error 2.397 131 0.018   
R Squared = .197 (Adjusted R Square = .178) 
Dependent Variable: Speed 
 
Table 4. Univariate Results with Speed as the Dependent Variable. 
 
Figure 3 delineates the results of the mean speed scores. As summarized in the 
table above, for a given level of trust (i.e., trust or mistrust condition), speed performance 
across the organization manipulation does not appear to vary much. The same is apparent 
for speed across the trust manipulation for a given organization type (i.e., Hierarchy or 
Edge). However, the interaction is highly significant. When the level of trust is low, the 
Hierarchy outperforms the Edge in terms of speed. It appears as though the Hierarchical 
organization structure enables participants in a mistrust environment to work 
comparatively more quickly than in the Edge. Alternatively, when the level of trust is 
high, the Edge outperforms the Hierarchy. It appears as though the Edge organization 
structure enables participants to work much more quickly than in the Hierarchy when 
trust is high. Notice that the Edge organization in the trust condition produces the highest 
overall performance in terms of speed. 
 
 Figure 3.   Interaction of Edge and Hierarchy for Speed. 
 
Table 5 shows accuracy as the dependent variable. In this case both main effects 
are significant at the 0.05 level, and the interaction effect is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Unlike the analysis above, in which neither main effect is significant, both the 
organization type and trust condition have strong influences on performance in terms of 







Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.287(a) 3 0.429 5.825 0.001 
Organization Type 0.429 1 0.429 5.818 0.017 
Trust Condition 0.325 1 0.325 4.406 0.038 
Organization Type *       
Trust Condition 0.528 1 0.528 7.161 0.000 
Error 9.652 131 0.074   
R Squared = .197 (Adjusted R Square = .178) 
Dependent Variable: Accuracy 
 
Table 5. Univariate Results with Accuracy at the Dependent Variable. 
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Figure 4 depicts the results of the mean accuracy scores. When the level of trust is 
low (i.e., the mistrust manipulation), there is negligible performance differential between 
organizational types in terms of accuracy. When mistrust pervades, the organization type 
does not appear to make much difference. Alternatively, when the level of trust is high, 
The Edge organization outperforms the Hierarchy. Interestingly, in the Hierarchy it does 
not appear to matter whether trust is present or not in terms of accuracy; performance is 
roughly the same across both trust and mistrust conditions. Notice too how the 
combination of Edge organization type and trust condition produces the highest overall 
performance in terms of accuracy. This parallels the result in terms of speed noted above.  
 
Figure 4.   Interaction of Edge and Hierarchy for Accuracy. 
 
B. KEY FINDINGS  
The results summarized above provide four important insights for organizational 





trust. If trust is present or can be developed in an organization, then the Edge form is 
superior to the Hierarchy in terms of both speed and accuracy. Indeed, the Edge 
organization with trust performs better than any other configuration examined through 
this experimentation. It appears as though the free information exchange and limited 
structure combine to produce high performance when organizational members trust one 
another. Alternatively, performance of the Edge organization in conditions of mistrust is 
much worse. It appears as though mistrust negates the performance advantages available 
through the Edge form. Where organizational designers and managers have the benefit of 
high trust levels in the organization, they should strive to create or maintain Edge forms, 
for they produce the best organizational performance. Likewise, where organizational 
designers and managers have created Edge forms, they must work diligently to establish 
and maintain those high trust levels. 
In contrast, performance in the Hierarchy Organization is comparatively 
insensitive to trust, particularly where accuracy is measured. If mistrust is present, 
possible or cannot be overcome in an organization, then the Hierarchy form is superior to 
the Edge in terms of both speed and accuracy.  Indeed, Hierarchy performance in terms 
of accuracy is nearly identical in trust vs. mistrust conditions. The situation is even more 
pronounced when speed is the dependent outcome. Hierarchy performance in terms of 
speed is greater in mistrust than in trust conditions. It appears as though the rules and 
constraints imposed by the Hierarchy are sufficiently effective to overcome negative 
performance impacts associated with conditions of mistrust. It appears also as though 
such rules and constraints are at inherent odds with high trust environments. Where 
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organizational designers and managers do not have the benefit of high trust levels in the 
organization, they should strive to create or maintain Hierarchy forms, for they offer the 
greatest level of safety.  
Second, a design and managerial tradeoff exists between organizational 
performance and safety. As summarized above, where trust is present or can be 
developed, the Edge delivers the highest performance, but where mistrust is present, 
possible or cannot be overcome, the Hierarchy is exposed to the least risk in terms of 
performance degradation. Organizational designers and managers must assess the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of Edge and Hierarchy forms within the contingency 
context of whether trust or mistrust prevails. Consistent with Contingency Theory, 
neither organizational form is superior across all trust-mistrust levels. 
Third, quite distinct from the Edge Organization described above, in which 
developing and maintaining high trust levels is vital, efforts to promote high trust levels 
in the Hierarchy may be futile. In terms of speed, the Hierarchy performs worse in 
conditions of trust than with mistrust, and in terms of accuracy, trust has negligible 
influence over performance. This implication is likely to be very controversial: it 
suggests that organizational managers in the Hierarchy should not concern themselves 
with promoting trust. Such implication requires additional investigation, as there are 
likely to be other, important factors affecting the results. 
Finally, organizational designers and managers should understand the strong 
interaction effects identified through this study. It is insufficient to design an organization 
as either and Edge or Hierarchy, for performance is dependent upon the trust-mistrust 
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conditions. Likewise, it is insufficient to promote either trust or mistrust, for performance 
is dependent upon the organizational design. Hence the combination of organizational 
design and trust level is key. Edge-trust organizations produce the best overall 
performance but exhibit greater risk in terms of performance degradation where high trust 
cannot be assured. Hierarchy organizations produce better performance where mistrust 
exists and represent safer forms where trust cannot be assured. Organizational designers 
and managers are called to pursue both design and trust changes in organizations to 
enhance and maintain performance while limiting risk. This provides a potentially 
important contribution to Contingency Theory: explicit and directional linkages between 





Due to its importance in the organization, substantial research on trust has been 
conducted and published, the majority of which either assumes or argues that 
organizational managers should always establish trust. However, research also indicates 
that trust levels have been declining, which raises an important issue for designers and 
managers of organizations that do not enjoy high levels of trust. If high levels of trust in 
the organization cannot be guaranteed, then trust level becomes an organizational 
contingency factor, and Contingency Theory suggests that different organizational 
designs may be comparatively more or less appropriate for different trust levels. 
Unfortunately, negligible research is available to guide organizational design on the basis 
of trust-mistrust.  
In this article, we address the level of trust as a contingency factor in 
organizational design and examine comparative performance in conditions exhibiting 
mistrust as well as trust. Using the ELICIT multiplayer intelligence game in a laboratory 
setting, we conduct a series of experiments to examine how trust level and organizational 
design affect performance in the context of a counterterrorism problem solving task 
environment. Specifically, we set up an experiment that controls the task environment 
and manipulates two variables in a full-factorial design: 1) organizational design (i.e., 
Hierarchy vs. Edge) and 2) trust condition (i.e., trust vs. mistrust).  
Results suggest that trust and organizational design have strong interactions and 
reveal a complex design space in which high levels of trust are not always necessary for 
good performance. Consistent with Contingency Theory, neither organizational form is 
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superior across all trust-mistrust levels. Results reveal also a substantial penalty for 
organizations with rigid, Hierarchical designs that impede the benefits of high trust 
levels. Indeed, controversial results suggest that efforts to promote high trust levels in the 
Hierarchy may be futile. In either case, results indicate that both organizational design 
and trust are important to performance and that neither is sufficient alone: in a 
contingency theoretic manner, they show how trust is an important factor in 
organizational design. 
These results also suggest an agenda for future research along the lines of this 
investigation. First, the controversial results reported above (esp. that high trust in the 
Hierarchy degrades performance) require deeper examination. The experiment should be 
replicated, and manipulation checks should be conducted with particular thoroughness, to 
ensure that the kinds of effects expected through trust and organizational design 
manipulations manifest themselves through the experiment.  
Second, the experiment can be modified to examine the different components of 
trust—perceived integrity, benevolence and competence—independently as well as in 
combination. The current design examines all three components as a single manipulation, 
but the comparative effects of each component may differ. Aside from the blanket 
hypothesis, “more trust is better,” it’s unclear how ability, benevolence and integrity 
would contribute separately to organizational performance in this task environment. 
Further, trust could be viewed as a dependent variable as well as an independent one. An 
additional experimental design could examine the effect of different organizational 
designs, leadership styles, communication protocols and other factors on the emergence 
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and development of trust over time (e.g., with pretest-posttest measures), and social 
network analysis of dyadic trust patterns may elucidate relationships that remain opaque 
at present. Qualitative analysis may prove insightful as well. For instance, ascertaining 
why various subjects trust or mistrust different participants—in terms of ability, 
benevolence and integrity —may reveal insightful patterns and trends. 
Third, the literature suggests several additional factors that may interact with trust 
and organizational design to affect performance in the kind of information sharing and 
problem solving task environment examined through this study. For instance, whether 
subjects are collocated or physically distributed may affect trust and performance—and 
require different organizational designs—as may the degree of homogeneity (e.g., in 
terms of nationality, culture, military service) of subjects assigned to teams. As another 
instance, the time allotted for trust and organizational performance is relatively short in 
this experimentation setting. Additional research that permits subjects to participate on 
the same teams through multiple sessions may uncover important longitudinal learning 
patterns.  
Additionally, both psychological and neural factors may influence the kinds of 
results identified through this study. For instance, a personality inventory (e.g., NEO-FFI) 
could be administered to subjects and correlated with information sharing behaviors, 
problem solving performance, and reported trust levels, in addition to the trust and 
organizational design manipulations accomplished in the present study. The same can be 
said for cognitive matching between different subjects and the kinds of rapport 
mechanisms that they use in trust-relevant circumstances. Understandable patterns 
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between personality traits, cognitive styles, trust, organizational design and performance 
could provide useful staffing knowledge to organizational designers and managers as 
they confront different trust levels and organizational designs.  
As another instance, advances in neural science suggest that different regions of 
the brain are responsible for the kinds of information sharing behaviors and trust 
perceptions seen to be important in this study. Advanced imaging techniques (e.g., fMRI) 
may reveal connections between neurological factors and personality traits, trust, 
organizational design and performance, which may provide useful staffing knowledge 
also to organizational designers and managers as they confront different trust levels and 
organizational designs.  
Finally, organizational designers and managers have potential to learn much 
through research along these lines. We trust that our continued work with ELICIT 
experimentation will continue to produce useful knowledge and controversial results. 
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